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TERRITORIAL DEFENSE TROOPS

PRESENT STATE
FORWARD DIRECTION CHANGES
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Introduction

Over the years after WW II, in face of multiple threats resulting from a political – military situation both in Europe and in the world, it is possible to notice the Ministry of Defense (MOD) motions to increase the level of national security. A character of these proposals depended on many factors. Financial aspects as well as subsequent alliances’ obligations and experiences which derived from hitherto military conflicts influenced the propositions. Some of them pointed out how an efficiently working territorial defense system is important for military activities – operational activities supported by irregular cover actions, often guerrilla ones in their character, and all that coordinated with defense activities conducted by other branches. That is why by the end of 1980s there were National Territorial Defense troops with their territorial defense elements.

In the same way the last twenty years are abundant with different projects and concepts focused on establishment and enhancement of the national defense system with the idea of creation or recreation, if you will, of the territorial defense troops as one of the military defense pillars. Some of them are as follows:

1) PhD Romuald Szeremietiew’s concept, dated 1998 (accepted in 1999), which assumed a need to have two components within the Polish Armed Forces: relatively small professional armed forces (operational troops) and common, mass, national army, meant as territorial defense. Initially, the concept was accepted for implementation however, over time, it was abandoned and the created territorial defense brigades were restructured into battalions or disbanded,

2) Poland’s Territorial Defense Strategic Concept in XXI century /strategic vision of the Poland’s Territorial Defense 2010/ elaborated by PhD Józef Marczak, which pointed out a necessity to have territorial defense as a separate component of the Polish Armed Forces, next to operational troops, capable to conduct military and non-military missions as well as to coordinate civilian – military activities,
3) National Reserve Force functioning improvement concept by Prof. dr habil Bogusław Pacek, dated 2015, as a project of changes in National Reserve Force (NRF) performance, based on an idea to utilize the NRF soldiers to create a territorial component of the Polish Armed Forces,

4) Territorial defense concept as a Polish Armed Forces citizens’ component dated 2016 and promoted by the association called Territorial Movement for the Polish Armed Forces Citizens’ Component. It assumed that territorial defense would function as a separate component subordinated to the Commander of the Polish Armed Forces General Command,

5) Territorial defense troops concept by PhD Grzegorz Kwaśniak dated 2016 according to which the territorial defense troops would act as the fifth component of the armed forces, next to the army, air force, navy and SOF (Special Operations Forces).

In the presented analysis there is concise information about an origin as well as about changes in the territorial forces after the WW II. The main focus are concepts elaborated after 2015 and documents officially approved by Ministers of Defense and implemented.

1. Foreign territorial defense formations

In open source materials about territorial defense of other countries there are different, sometimes contradictory data concerning their role, subordination, tasks, structure, training system, equipment or size. Analysis of these materials points out that in many cases the main source of information is articles on internet which refer to press releases. In part of elaborations and comparisons, the terms: territorial defense, reserve army or national guard are used interchangeable, with the same meaning. Incorrect unification of terminology derives from key similarities among these types of formations:

1) They are mobilized temporarily for exercises, crises responses, e.g. natural disasters, and in case of war,

2) Their key role is to support operational forces.
A reserve army – differently than territorial defense – is not characterized by territoriality of actions. However, it has limitations in offensive capabilities and maneuverability comparatively to operational troops. Similarly to a national guard it is usually equipped in heavy weaponry, older types mostly. As a result a reserve army is to be calculated as a part of an operational forces component within which it may fulfill territorial defense tasks. In some cases territorial defense subunits might be a part of a reserve army but because of that it is not to make them equal.

Yet another example is Sweden where the National Guard is an integral part of the operational troops. Due to the state’s policy and military doctrine there is a territorial defense system in Sweden and specific elements of the country defense system are subordinated to the policy and doctrine.

There are many countries which maintain both national guard and reserve army however, only few have typical territorial defense units. Lastly, it means before 2017, Poland had territorial defense units which were mobilized in case of war only.

Information delivered in this part of the report is mostly based on data available on official websites of particular countries’ military organizations and, in the annual report of the Military Balance¹ (data from 2017).

a) The United States of America

The National Guard (NG) is a militia type formation which supplements regular U.S. armed forces. It fulfills its tasks together with the U.S. Reserve Forces. In the U.S. law system it is authorized by the Constitution of the United States.²

The National Guard is a voluntary formation with an 8-year duty. However, the volunteers can choose either a 3-year or a 6-year variant and after that they can transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve. Being a part of it they are ready for calls connected to local threats up to the 8 years contract but they do not take part in training and exercises with their own unit.³ The NG task is to support both the state

¹ The report includes an annual assessment of global military capabilities and defense economy of particular countries.
² Article I § 8 of the Constitution says that Congress is authorized to “calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”.
and local community. The key mission is response for inner threats as well as in situations which require the U.S. Armed Forces presence abroad.

On the federal level the NG is a part of the U.S. Armed Forces and is subordinated to the President of the U.S., who is the Commander in Chief. It can be used in response to threats for the state e.g. border protection and in combat and stability operations abroad. That is why this formation has been present in Iraq at the New Dawn, in Afghanistan at the Enduring Freedom and, in Libya at the Odyssey Dawn operation. The NG has also been present at different combat and training missions in: Kuwait, South Korea, Georgia, Romania, Kosovo, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania or Slovakia.4

On the state level the NG members are subordinated to a specific governor. The key tasks for particular states are connected to crisis response activities (floods, hurricanes, earthquakes) and response to man-made emergencies such as riots and civil unrest, or terrorist attacks. It also include a police support in operations against drugs as well as local authorities’ support in case of emergencies in terms of evacuation, communication systems and transportation.

Nowadays the NG consists of the Army National Guard (ARNG) with 8 divisions and independent brigades and, Air National Guard (ANG).

Usually, the NG members are obliged once per month5 to take part in a weekend training and once per year in a two-week exercise organized in summer. If a volunteer has not serve previously (is not a Reserve soldier) he / she has to pass a physical test and, subsequently, there is a candidate’s assessment test called the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). It enables to define a candidate’s carrier path in accordance with his / her interests and skills and, in which profession his / her capabilities might be used in the best way. Based on it, after the initial training, a volunteer is directed to either infantry or air force, artillery, SOF or military intelligence, logistics branch, signal, engineers, medical service, transportation, maintenance or in administration.

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4 http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Overseas-Operations/
5 A training is usually conducted in Saturday and Sunday; sometimes it starts at Friday / Saturday night.
The next step is to send a candidate to the Basic Combat Training (BCT). Time from the ASVAB to the BCT depends on a profession and lasts from a few weeks to a few months. In this time he/she participates in a preparatory program, so called the Recruit Sustainment Program (RSP). For every day of an active participation in the RSP he/she is paid. In this phase a volunteer is familiarized with terminology and rules existing in the NG, its history and tasks and, he/she gets ready to the BCT. The BCT itself lasts ten weeks and is divided on three phases – Red Phase (1-3 week), White Phase (4-5 week) and Blue Phase (6-9 week) – in which gradually he/she gets familiar with the basics of military service.

When the BCT is concluded, a candidate is directed to the Advanced Individual Training (AIT) where he/she is familiarized with chosen military specialty (Military Occupation Specialty) what means with job and tasks which he/she will fulfill for the NG. Time and place of the AIT depend on the character of future tasks.\(^6\)

\(^7\)It lasts from 2 to 12 months.

People admitted to the NG are between 17- and 35-year-old. Exceptions are volunteers over 35 who served in military, know foreign languages or have very specific skills. Moreover, the necessary conditions for all volunteers are: the U.S. citizenship, good health status (including mental one), physical fitness and morality and no criminal record.

To conclude, the National Guard is the formation essentially destined to defend the U.S. territory however, due to the American law regulations, equipment available and similarity to operational troops and proper training level, it is a valid supplement for operational forces at operations abroad.

**b) Great Britain**

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\(^6\) https://obronanarodowa.pl/artykuly/display/wykorzystanie-doswiadczen-amerykanskiej-gwardii-narodowej-w-tworzeniu-bezpieczenstwa-polski-w-xxi-wieku.

\(^7\) http://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/Army-National-Guard/About-Us/Training/.
The United Kingdom Armed Forces apart from the operational troops (152 350 soldiers) consist of 81 350\(^8\) Army Reserve (AR) soldiers, previously called Territorial Army\(^9\) (TA), who serve in 70 key units, from which:

1) 44 200 Regular Reserves (Army – 29 900, Navy – 6 900, Air Force – 7 400),
2) 35 350 Volunteer Reserves (Army – 29 300, Navy – 3 450, Air Force – 2 600),
3) Sponsored Reserves\(^{10}\) - 2000.

 Probably due to the previous name of the Army Reserve, the Territorial Army, in many articles and publications it is described as a territorial defense formation. However, as mentioned at the beginning, it is rather incorrect comparison.

The Army Reserve ensures to maintain well trained soldiers or volunteers (depending on a type of reserve) who are capable to cooperate with operational troops at operations both in the UK and abroad. The AR personnel are civilians who declare their obligations to the military in terms of annual training and readiness to join the military for a period described in a contract. Usually they train for a whole year in limited size (an evening per week or a weekend per month) and they mandatorily participate in an annual training which lasts about two weeks. When at training or in service they are paid in the same way like active duty soldiers.

An additional difference between the RA and territorial defense troops is that their members create an important element for expeditionary brigades’ formation process. The personnel of these brigades is a mixture of active duty and reserve soldiers periodically trained in accordance with their specialties.\(^{11}\)

c) Sweden

\(^8\) Data presented In the Military Balance 2017 annual report. On the official website of the GB Armed Forces there are data dated 2014 with 35 000 soldiers of the Army Regular Reserves, 36 000 Long Term Reserves and Volunteer Reserves.
\(^9\) http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/10069.html#TYPES%20OF%20TA%20UNITS
\(^{10}\) “Tworzenie i organizacja „aktywnej rezerwy” Sił Zbrojnych na przykładzie brytyjskiej armii terytorialnej” (“Creation and organization of armed forces “active reserves” based on the British territorial army”) Grzegorz Matyasik, www.obronanarodowa.pl, „Employees businessmen who agreed to join the Reserves continue their civil activities as a part of the TA based on the agreement between a businessman and the MOD. About 2000 sponsored reservists served in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Home Guard – National Security Forces (Hemvärnet – Nationella skyddstyrkorna) is an integral part of the Swedish Armed Forces operational troops and it comprises about 22,000 soldiers. It maintains a high level of readiness and mobilization time of most of the units counts rather in hours than in days or weeks. The Home Guard is a supplement of the Armed Forces in many forms of defense activities – starting from a civilian support at peace time up to combat at war. In accordance with the Swedish doctrine the Guard may be used in the whole country what is especially important in crisis situations and the key advantage – what Swedish point out – is their knowledge of the terrain.

The Home Guard units are contemporary military organizations with the main task to secure, monitor and support the society at the time of a crisis. In the same time, at war, they build up the Swedish national and territorial defense bastions.

The Home Guard consists of operationally ready 40 battalions equipped with advanced and adjusted to assumed tasks equipment. Particular units are trained to obtain required capabilities e.g. reconnaissance units collect information at recce tours and are supported by the Guard air force equipped with light airplanes Cessna 172. The Guard navy sections together with the coast guard patrol along the Swedish coast line and its many islands.

In case of natural disaster, man-made one or other threats for the society, the Home Guard is capable to support the police activities as well as other first responders. The Guard possesses CBRN platoons as well as movement control and engineering ones. Moreover, The Guards’ 26 music bands ensure ceremonial support in the whole country.

A candidate applying to join the Home Guard is supposed to meet the requirements as follows:

1) Swedish citizenship,
2) Approval of personal appraisal - personal examination by the Military Intelligence and Security department,
3) Positive opinion from police and local authorities,
4) Conclude minimum 3 months of basic training,
5) Availability for duty in the Home Guard.

The Guard practices regularly and the Guard soldiers’ skills are periodically tested.

d) Norway

Norwegian experiences prove that it is feasible to maintain efficient territorial formations at relatively low costs. Similarly to Sweden there is a territorial defense system in Norway. To support the operational troops, in 1946 the Norwegian Home Guard was founded - Norwegian: Heimevernet (HV), capable for rapid mobilization.

The Guard consists of army units, air force and navy. Its current “militia” character is a result of relatively low conventional conflict threat level perception in Norway. Its main focus is auxiliary tasks what is reflected in its equipment.\(^\text{16}\) The Guard supports operations to secure territorial integrity, secure key infrastructure as a part of crisis response activities, enhance military presence and support the society.\(^\text{17}\) Its capability to conduct military operations against military units are highly limited – it is not capable to manage typical combat operations. The Guard’s volunteers can participate in multinational military operations.

Contemporary the Home Guard has a wartime personnel number of about 45 000, from which:

1) App. 600 peacetime active soldiers,\(^\text{18}\)
2) 3 500 Rapid Reaction Force personnel in 15 expeditionary units: land force (3 000) and navy (500); the mobilization time up to 24 hrs,
3) 20 000 "Strengthening Force" personnel,

\(^{16}\) The key equipment is: small arms (HK 417, HK 416, AG 3), anti tank launchers Carl Gustaf. Nowadays, it is not equipped with guided anti tank or air defense systems.

\(^{17}\) https://forsvaret.no/en/organization/home-guard.

4) 20 000 "Follow-up Force" personnel, with longer readiness requirements.

The Home Guard is divided into 4 regions, 11 districts and 241 municipalities that cover the whole country. Besides, there are 15 subunits of above mentioned Rapid Reaction Force.

The Home Guard is equipped with light vehicles, trucks, motorcycles and small boats. In case of a war threat or a crisis it is planned to mobilize civilian boats and transportation means. Such a solution allows to maintain an operational capability at relatively low costs. Moreover, the logistics support is ensured mainly by civilian enterprises.\(^\text{19}\)

e) Estonia

In nineties of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century the authorities in Tallinn assumed that a chance for Estonia in case of a military conflict is a mass defense against an aggressor while waiting for NATO forces support. The key task of the Defense Forces consisting of app. 5 600 soldiers is to train reservists and conscripts – depending on specialty it last 8 to 11 months. Considering the Crimean operation dynamics it is in doubt to rapidly mobilize forces based on reservists, conscripts, paramilitary organizations’ members – with The Estonian Defense League (Kaitselliit) as a leading one – especially in case of taking over key strategic defense elements by “little green men” or separatists (e.g. bridges, railway stations, administration facilities).\(^\text{20}\)

Estonia sticks to the Finish defense model – total defense principle, conscript army with professional elements – maintains classical territorial defense based on the country’s administrative division. The Defense League consisting of app. 14 800 members\(^\text{21}\) and, together with the female organization (Naiskodukaitse) and teenagers’ ones for boys and girls (Noored Kotkad & Kodututred) app. 23 600, is a land formation which fulfills, among other, anti-tank tasks as well as traditional


\(^{21}\) IAW The Military Balance 2017, at the end of 2016 there were 15 800 members of the Defense League in 15 districts.
terrestrial defense functions. Considering the full spectrum of the Defense League activities, which seriously exceed territorial defense tasks, the League is more like the U.S. National Guard.

The Defense League, wholly voluntary formation, besides the operational troops support ensures an enhancement for fire brigade and police, mainly to secure mass events. Kaitseliit units have also taken part in peace keeping operations in Balkans. The basic weapon of the League is: assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank launchers, 122 mm and 155 mm artillery and 81 mm and 120 mm mortars. Some formations are equipped with Carl Gustaf launchers and wheeled armored vehicles BTR-80.

f) Other Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania)

In Latvia and Lithuania the decisive factors for the territorial defense were armed forces’ reforms connected with joining NATO and which resulted in priorities to build expeditionary capabilities in place of territorial defense ones. In both countries which abandoned conscript and implemented professional military service model (Latvia in 2006, Lithuania in 2008) the territorial defense units partially fulfill reserve force’s tasks and traditional territorial defense formations’ ones. Territorial defense units in Latvia and Lithuania are territorially organized land formations which are the reserve basis for professional army and are responsible for reservists’ training and personnel augmentation in other types of the armed forces.

- Latvia

The Latvian National Guard (Zemessardze) consisting of app. 8 000 members fulfills a wide range of tasks from antitank activities, through air-defense, engineering, up to combating effects of CBRN weapons. Besides traditional territorial defense

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25 IAW The Military Balance 2017 – in the Latvian National Guard there are 600 soldiers at peacetime, temporary 7 850, what gives 8 450 all together.
tasks the formation may participate in operations abroad, as a part of the Rapid Reaction Force including.\textsuperscript{26}

Both, a reform and modernization of the National Guard became one of the Ministry of Defense priorities. It was caused by underinvestment, plans to build-up reserves and a wish to engage the society deeper in the process to enhance the country’s defense level. In 2014 the Ministry of Defense managed to assign ad hoc extra resources for training and ammunition for the Guard. It enabled to train additional members and prolong the exercises from 8 to 10 days per year.\textsuperscript{27}

Up to 2018, 18 units of the National Guard with higher readiness level and capable for rapid actions are supposed to be founded. Rapid Reaction Forces will be better equipped and trained thanks to 20-day annual exercises at minimum. Structure changes is to result in an increase of the Guard members’ number to 12 000 in 2020. Above presented initiatives are supplemented by purchases of new equipment from Norwegian army reserves. The National Guard has received 800 Carl Gustaf launchers, 50 trucks and 50 cross-country vehicles.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Lithuania}
\end{itemize}

In Lithuania – comparatively to Latvia and Estonia – the Crimea annexation influenced the discussion about territorial defense, in the context of the hybrid war, in the least degree. It derives from the fact that the Russian minority is only 6\% of the country inhabitants (in Latvia about 27\%, in Estonia about 25\%) what results in the opinion that potential protests on a large scale inspired by Russia are less probable, though possible. In Lithuania a conventional Russian attack is seen as more probable scenario, e.g. an effort to create a land connection between the strongly militarized Kaliningrad region and Belarus.\textsuperscript{29} That is why the priority is to modernize the mechanized brigade “Iron Wolf”.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ministry of Defense(Latvia), the State Defense Concept, 20.04.2012, http://www.mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Plani,%20koncepcijas/2012_va_EN.ashx.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ministry of Defense(Latvia) http://www.mod.gov.lv/Aktualitates/Preses_pazinojumi/2014/04/08-02.aspx.
\item \textsuperscript{28} https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2015-03-20/formacje-obrony-terytorialnej-panstw-baltyckich-w-obliczu.
\item \textsuperscript{29} https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2015-03-20/formacje-obrony-terytorialnej-panstw-baltyckich-w-obliczu.
\end{itemize}
The Lithuanian National Defense Volunteer Forces (KASP) consisting of about 4,850 members\(^{30}\) realize antitank tasks as well as a urban terrain combat. They may participate in the operations abroad, too.\(^{31}\) Moreover, there is the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union that operates under the Ministry of Defense auspices – the paramilitary organization consisting of app. 8,000 members who, in case of war, are taken into reserve units. For many people a membership in the Riflemen’s Union is a preparation phase for later service in the KASP.

2. Territorial Defense Troops before 2015

To analyze open source available documents which describe changes in the Polish Armed Forces after the WW II and in the whole state’s defense system, a special attention should be paid to the role of a territorial defense system. It might be noticed in numerous publications that forces that realize tasks in this system are wrongly identified with territorial defense troops. The common trait of both formations seems to be only: territorially attached personnel reserves resources and, in many cases – especially in the case of infrastructure protection and air defense – tasks fulfilled in the units’ assembly areas.

Territorial Defense Troops (according to the name) in reality appeared for the first time in 1960s when in May 1959 the Country Defense Committee accepted the resolution\(^{32}\) which distinguished the Country Territorial Defense (CTD) formation in the armed forces structure. A concept was elaborated in accordance with which the CTD was subordinated to the Chief of General Staff\(^{33}\) and its key tasks were as follows:

1) Provide internal order and security,
2) Political and administrative authorities’ protection,


\(^{33}\) Directly commanded by military districts’ commanders.
3) Key infrastructure protection (facilities important from the country defense perspective, industrial and communication centers) against air raids, airborne assaults and commandos for diversion,

4) Providing relief from war destructions.

Based on threats analysis the key defense areas were determined for the newly created CTD troops. There were 5 defense areas against the bombing raids and 4 against airborne assaults and diversions.

In the CTD it was preplanned to concentrate all existing types of forces which had a territorial character including:

1) Country Air Defense Troops,
2) Internal (Internal Security Corp units),
3) Border security troops,
4) Coastal defense troops,
5) Engineering troops,
6) Technical – engineering to maintain Odra and Vistula rivers’ passages which were supposed to be assigned from the territorial air defense units34,
7) Movement control units,
8) Reserve and training units.

Moreover it was planned that in case of war the CTD would be additionally reinforced by newly mobilized forces like Territorial Defense Units (TD)35. The key tasks of these units were as follows:

1) Protection of facilities important for the national industry, administration centers, technical facilities, water springs and so on,
2) Patrolling and security of communication routes, bridges, river passages, hydro-technical equipment and communication and power lines,
3) Participation in rescue actions conducted after CBRN attacks,
4) Militia’s support to ensure public order in cities and settlements,

34 Forces subordinated to the Ministry of Interior.
35 It was planned to mobilize TD regiments In every voivodeship (province) city and bigger county ones what resulted in that time in 23 TD regiments and, additionally, a TD battalion in every county. To sum up it was planned to mobilize 317 battalions.
5) Combating small enemy groups for diversion and participation in anti air-assault operations conducted by the CTD troops,
6) Maintaining communication,
7) Participation in natural disaster relief operations and activities for the national industry.

Other ministries were included in the CTD system as well: Communication Ministry, Water Transportation Ministry, Communal Industry and Construction ones. Sets of tasks were assigned to them, tasks important for proper operations of the country at war. It was assumed that the CTD system organized in such a way should meet requirements described in the country territorial defense operational plan36:

1) Critical national infrastructure defense including important political – administration and industrial centers, communication infrastructure, defense facilities and equipment,
2) Own and allied forces protection against air bombing,
3) Mobilization process’s support,
4) Own and allied forces protection while moving through the country’s territory and maneuver to operate at an external area of operation,
5) Defense against tactical air assaults and enemy commandos activities37,
6) CBRN weapon effects relief38,
7) Preparation of reserves and materials to support operational and own troops.

The period of 1966 – 1970 was the next important phase of the Territorial Defense (TD) troops development when, according to the CTD development concept accepted in 196539, it was assumed that all youngsters capable for military service would be trained. The main tool for this was to be the TD where three formats of the training were supposed to be organized: in barracks, day to day and, a mixture of these two.

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37 Especially when the groups attack industrial and communication facilities, command and control points and other key objectives.
38 Including Communications Network rebuild, industrial and communal facilities and society’s security.
The first one assumed two-year service in 8-month per year cycles within which it was planned to conduct 2-month common military training after which there was a period of work for the country. According to the assumption such a form was supposed to be organized in units with necessary training facilities. The other training formats, day to day and mixed ones, were supposed to be used in the rest of the TD battalions.

Implementation of such the concept required an increase in the number of the TD battalions. As a result in the period up to 1970 it was scheduled to found 18 TD brigades and regiments with 50 000 soldiers all together and, additionally, 350 TD battalions with 230 000 soldiers among which: 50 000 were to be trained in barracks and 230 000 in a day to day training form or a mixed one. These units were to focus their effort on work for the national industry as an initial phase for soldiers for their professional preparation. Simultaneously, this work was similar to the one realized at war as an air bombings effects relief actions.

However, in reality the planned development was highly limited because of lack of barracks infrastructure and proper number of professional soldiers. It concerned especially these ones who were designated to take part in a day to day trainings and a mixture one.

It is to be pointed out that in the analogical period of time the operational forces stabilized their structure. They consisted of 15 divisions with 200 000 to 300 000 soldiers, depending on an analyzed year.

The following years can be characterized as a permanent reduction of the TD troops as well as the whole CTD system. Both operational units and TD ones were dissolved. As the result at the beginning of the 1990s the TD formation stopped existing.

40 The process was supposed to be realized in the voivodeship and county TD battalions.
41 In the commented period of time the armed forces consisted of 15 divisions, including 5 armor, 8 mechanized, 1 marines and 1 air assault. In case of mobilization 1.1 M men were called including 450 K of operational troops to create the Polish external positions and 650 K designated to the country’s territory defense as the CTD troops. Additionally, the Civil Defense was to ensure security of civilians.
42 After 1970 a part of the TD battalions which functioned in a day to day system and a few regiments were dissolved. In 1980s the process was continued what resulted in dissolution of all such units.
43 Some units were dissolved and the rest restructured as security units or transferred to the Ministry of Interior. In 1989 the air defense troops were excluded from the CTD system and were attached to the air force.
Political – military changes in the East-Central Europe which occurred at the turn of 1990s revealed new threats for Poland. As the effect in 1990 there was an attempt to reactivate the TD troops. In accordance with the accepted assumptions territorial defense brigades and regiments subordinated to the military districts’ commanders were supposed to be created. From the organizational stand point these units where replicas of the previously existing interior troops formations and essentially were supposed to be a support for the operational troops.44

In 1992, in the elaborated model of the armed forces’ development Armed Forces 2005, regional defense troops were renamed into territorial defense ones with assumption that in every of four military district it would be one TD brigade. In case of war, based on every of these brigades there were plans to found: 2-3 TD brigades, 3-5 TD regiments, engineering regiment and pontoon one. All together in the whole country there were supposed to be founded: 8-12 TD brigades, 9-15 TD regiments, 4 engineering and 4 pontoon regiments. Besides, there were independent units founded as well: TD battalions, fortress battalions and infrastructure security battalions. Simultaneously, in the air forces it was planned to found security battalions and in the navy – observation battalions45. In 1994 – 1995 the first three TD brigades were founded at so called Eastern Wall as a reinforcing element of relatively small operational forces located there.

In January 1999 the new Concept of the territorial defense development was accepted. The Concept assumed that to 2012 the TD troops would attain a number of 10 000 soldiers and in case of either crisis situation or war they would reach 120 K troops. According to the above mentioned Concept, in every voivodeship there was to be one TD brigade and in the Masovian Voivodeship there were to be two what resulted in 17 TD brigades all together. Moreover, it was planned to found independent TD battalions, security battalions, fortification battalions and, as their enhancement, special purpose units. The enlargement was divided on four phases to creating air force and air defense troops. As a result at the beginning of the 1990s the CTD system was dissolved.

44 R. Jakubczak, Współczesne wojska obrony terytorialnej, Warszawa 2016, s. 74, (Contemporary territorial defense troops, page 74).
2012. Although the Concept was approved by that time Minister of defense, its realization faced frequent delays and obstacles.

Implementing accepted assumptions, in 1999 – 2001 seven TD brigades were founded however, when minister Romuald Szeremietiew was called off, the process inhibited and, subsequently, the next TD troops’ reduction took place.

In 2002, a TD troops’ remodel concept was accepted and the number of TD troops decreased to 2 – 3 K soldiers in peace time and 50 – 70 K at war. In 2003, the TD brigade in Gliwice was dissolved and two years later the brigade in Mińsk Mazowiecki followed suit. In 2007 / 2008 the other brigades were reduced to a battalion size units and, subsequently, they were restructured into mechanized battalions and included in operational forces. In mobilization plans it was assumed that the TD battalions would be founded in case of war and they would include app. 50 K soldiers.

3. Civil Defense

A formation which practically was forgotten in our country, even though it is obliged to conduct tasks within the natural disaster relief actions, is civil defense. A responsibility for such actions derives from the article No 137 of the Act on the Common Defense Duty of the Republic of Poland, dated 21 November 1967. According to the regulation the civil defense is to protect people, companies, publicly used facilities and culture heritage, saving and providing assistance to people suffering from war, cooperating in order to combat natural disasters, environmental threats and to remove their negative consequences.

Moreover, based on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), civil defense is obliged to fulfill humanitarian tasks to protect civilians against threats resulting from war activities or natural disasters and

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47 Dz.U. z 2017 r. poz. 1430.
48 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977 (Dz.U. from 1992, No 41, position 175, appendix).
combating their immediate effects and, to ensure conditions necessary to survive. The key tasks are as follows:

1) warning,
2) evacuation,
3) organization and management of shelters,
4) management of blackout measures,
5) rescue,
6) medical services, including first aid, and religious assistance,
7) fire-fighting,
8) detection and marking of dangerous areas,
9) decontamination and similar protective measures,
10) provision of emergency accommodation and supplies,
11) emergency assistance in the restoration and maintenance of order in distressed areas,
12) emergency repair of indispensable public utilities,
13) emergency disposal of the dead,
14) assistance in the preservation of objects essential for survival,
15) complementary activities necessary to carry out any of the tasks mentioned above, including, but not limited to, planning and organization.

In accordance with the Article No 17 of the already mentioned Act on Common Defense Duty of the Republic of Poland, the central governmental body for civil defense affairs is the Chief of the National Civil Defense, assigned by the Prime Minister based on a Ministry of Interior application.49

The range of duties and responsibilities of the National Civil Defense Chief include:

1) preparation of drafts of assumptions and rules of engagement for the civil defense,
2) establishment of key rules for civil defense tasks realization,

49 Since 22 December 2015 a Chief of the Country Civil Defense is Brig. Gen. Leszek Suski – Chief of the National Fire Brigade.
3) coordination of particular events related to civil defense and control over their realization by governmental and municipal organizations,
4) supervision over a service in the civil defense.

A detailed range of duties and responsibilities of a Chief of the Civil Defense and civil defense chiefs in: voivodeships, counties and communities as well as ways and rules to lead and coordinate preparations and realizations of civil defense events is described by the Ministers’ Council in its ordinance. A chief of the Civil Defense is subordinated to a ministry of interior. In events connected to his / her range of duties and responsibilities he / she disseminates ordinances, directives, instructions and regulations.

Based on the Ministers’ Council ordinance dated 25 June 2002 on detailed range of duties and responsibilities for a Chief of the National Civil Defense, chiefs of civil defense in voivodeships, counties and communities, the civil defense chiefs elaborate tasks, control their realization, coordinate and manage actions connected to preparation and realization of civil defense operations:

1) Chief of the National Civil Defense – chiefs of civil defense in voivodeships,
2) Chief of civil defense in a voivodeship – chiefs of civil defense in counties,
3) Chief of civil defense in a county – chiefs of civil defense in communities,
4) Chief of civil defense in a community – chiefs of civil defense in institutions, social rescue organizations, at companies and at other organizations operating in a community.

Territorial representatives of the civil defense are province (voivodeship) governors, foremen and mayors (city presidents). The range of the civil defense chiefs’ duties and responsibilities includes management and coordination of preparations and realizations of civil defense events by national institutions and organizations, enterprises and other entities and social organizations existing in their area of responsibilities.

50 Dz.U. No 96, position 850.
Civil defense chiefs of voivodeships, counties and communities as well as institutions, organizations, other entities and social rescue organizations elaborate multi-year and annual plans of activities in the area of civil defense. The plans are coordinated with territorially proper civil defense cells.

A Chief of the National Civil Defense and civil defense chiefs of voivodeships, counties and communities coordinating preparation and realization of civil defense events include also civil defense activities of companies for which the Minister of Defense is a founder and entities subordinated to the Minister of Interior and Administration or supervised by him especially within a detection and warning system (with early warning one), inhabitants’ evacuation and resources detached for rescue operations.

The Act on the Common Defense Duty of the Republic of Poland besides pointing administration organizations for civil defense\(^{51}\) describes as well:

1) A way to create and a structure of a civil defense formation,
2) Citizens duty for civil defense based on civil defense service, education in the area of security and trainings in the area of a common self-defense,
3) People who are obliged to serve in civil defense,
4) A way to call for duty in civil defense formations and a way of service,
5) Organization and a period of a service or training in civil defense formations,
6) Education obligations for security which include pupils of primary and secondary schools – excluding participants of the schools for adults,
7) An obligation to train people in terms of a common self-defense.

Even though all the obligations of governmental administration organizations and other governmental entities, national institutions, municipal organizations as well as businessmen and tasks which derive from law regulations connected to the Act on the Common Defense Duty of the Republic of Poland concerning civil defense, rescue operations and natural disasters relief actions are conducted by other

formations like fire brigade and armed forces. It is to be outlined that the Minister of Defense, based on Article 25 of the Act on Crisis Management\textsuperscript{52}, on a motion of a province governor, may detach for his / her disposal Polish Armed Forces units if other resources cannot be used or they are inefficient.

A tendency to delegate tasks which belong to civil defense e.g. people protection and disaster relief operations, to military units is visible for the last few years in case of determining tasks for the armed forces formation – Territorial Defense Troops.

To get familiar with initiatives to create a territorial component, started in 2015 and 2016, which differ in terms of its organization, candidates’ training, way of use, there are two concepts presented: by Bogusław Pacek\textsuperscript{53} and Grzegorz Kwaśniak\textsuperscript{54}.

4. A concept to establish a territorial component of the Polish Armed Forces

In the set of projects elaborated in the Ministry of Defense to increase Polish Armed Forces capabilities and capacities, in June 2015 the Minister of Defense Tomasz Siemoniak approved a decision to implement “A Concept of the Nation Reserve Forces Development”\textsuperscript{55}.

The concept elaborated by Prof. dr habil Bogusław Pacek assumed a change in National Reserve Force’s (NRF) functioning. It was based on an idea to use the NRF soldiers to build a territorial component of the armed forces.

It was adopted that the territorial component which consists of 2 500 positions at peace time – 500 for professional soldiers and 2 000 for NRF soldiers – would be founded in 2016-2019. It was to exist in a form of military unit at peace and be a platform to build territorial defense troops in case of war. Moreover, it was calculated that in 2016-2023 the limit of professional soldiers would be increased up

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\textsuperscript{52} The Act on Crisis Management dated 26 April 2007 (Dz.U. 2017, pos. 209, 1566).
\textsuperscript{53} Prof. dr habil Bogusław Pacek – Minister’s of Defense Advisor (March 2015).
\textsuperscript{54} PhD Grzegorz Kwaśniak – Minister’s of Defense Representative for Territorial Defense Establishment (since 30 December 2015).
\textsuperscript{55} Decision No 224/MON of the Ministry of Defense dated 23 June 2015 on the National Reserve Force development.
to 110 000 (including 109 500 for the operational component and 500 mentioned above for the territorial component) what means 10 000 more than in 2015.

Within the number of 2 000 positions for NRF and legal possibilities to assign a few crisis tasks to positions described in a unit’s establishment plan – including positions with such assignments\(^\text{56}\) but in practice no more than 2-3 soldiers on a single position – the real number of the component was to be 4 500 NRF soldiers with a rotational type of service.

The territorial component would consist of 16 territorial military units with battalion structures, attached to the provincial (voivodeship) military HQs and, depending on a requirement, 20 local companies – at least one per every provincial military HQ and 86 territorial subunits – in the areas of particular military mobilization centers. Both an establishment plan and manning of the territorial military units would differ depending on tasks and requirements connected to them – increased in case of mobilization and war.

The concept allowed to utilize the territorial military units at peace time – in crisis management situations and, at war as a support for operational forces. As a result compulsory military training for reserve soldiers with attached mobilization tasks concerning territorial defense units’ foundation was assumed – at least once per five years.

The key issue for the territorial component foundation was to maintain hitherto capabilities and capacities of the operational troops because the units’ enhancement would be ensured by members of paramilitary organizations operating in a particular area within NRF.

Professional soldiers who served in the territorial component would be responsible for command and control, training as well as combat readiness of the territorial units and subunits. Equipment for the NRF units was supposed to be stored in military units responsible for training within military exercises.

Utilization, supervision and training coordination of territorial military units would be ensured by Chiefs of territorially specific province military HQs.

To sum up, the change of NRF functioning, planned from 1st January 2016, rested on:

1) Creation, in 3 years, a territorial component of the Polish Armed Forces consisting of 2,500 positions at peace time – 500 for professional soldiers and 2,000 for NRF soldiers,
2) Foundation of the territorial component without a decrease in capabilities and capacities of the operational troops; a supervision over training would be maintain by chiefs of provinces military HQs,
3) Increase to 110,000 in 8-year period of time the number of professional soldiers.

Advantages of the proposed solutions:

1) Utilization of the paramilitary organizations’ resources and NRF soldiers to supplement territorial component units,
2) Creation of the territorial component would not affect the number of professional soldiers and capabilities of operational troops,
3) An increase of the number of trained reserve soldiers through training of volunteers to territorial military units as a part of NRF preparation service,
4) Implementation of the concept did not require legal changes in terms of the common defense duty and crisis management.

Drawbacks of the discussed concept:

1) Lack of suggestions to adapt the recruitment system to increased requirements of particular forms of military service and to improve its efficiency especially concerning professional military service,
2) Avoiding issues connected to motivation aspects\textsuperscript{57} to encourage joining territorial military units.

In accordance with the Ministry of Defense Decision No 224/MON, dated 23 June 2015 on improvements in the National Reserve Force, it was supposed to be implemented on 1 January 2016.

However, the solutions were not implemented in the Polish Armed Forces due to the fact that in 2016 the work to elaborate a new concept of territorial defense started.

5. Territorial Defense Troops’ creation concept

Different from the presented above is the Concept of the Territorial Defense Troops creation signed by Minister of Defense Antoni Macierewicz on 25 April 2016 and prepared by the Minister’s of Defense Representative for Territorial Defense Establishment, PhD Grzegorz Kwaśniak.

The key tasks of the territorial defense troops included:

1) Combat in cooperation with the operational forces,
2) People’s protection against natural disasters’ effects,
3) Participation in crisis management activities,
4) Cooperation with national defense system’s elements, especially with the governmental and municipal administration,
5) People’s protection against disinformation and destabilization of a situation in the country,
6) Propagation of patriotic education in society.

According to the Concept, the territorial defense troops are supposed to function in a structure adjusted to the levels of the country administration division – the Command of the Territorial Defense Troops (TDT) on the highest level, brigades and battalions’ HQs on a province (voivodeship) level and battalions and companies’ HQs on a community level.

\textsuperscript{57} Payment, material elements and other ones.
A process to achieve the TDT final organizational structure in years 2016 – 2019 was divided onto four phases:

1) Foundation of the TDT Command and three brigade HQs and battalions in provinces: podlaskie, lubelskie and podkarpackie, by the end of 2016,

2) Foundation of next three brigade HQs and battalions in provinces: warmińsko-mazurskie and mazowieckie, by the end of 2017,

3) Foundation of seven brigade HQs and battalions in provinces: pomorskie, kujawsko-pomorskie, wielkopolskie, łódzkie, świętokrzyskie, małopolskie, śląskie, in 2018,

4) Foundation of four brigade HQs and battalions in provinces: zachodniopomorskie, lubuskie, dolnośląskie and opolskie, in 2019.

Assuming that the above mentioned phases are concluded the TDT will consist of seventeen brigades HQs together with subordinated battalions and companies (one per a county) and the number of soldiers – according to Ministry of Defense Antoni Macierewicz announcements - should reach 53 000 by the end of 2019. There are two types of soldiers serving in the TDT: professional soldiers and soldiers of a new type of active duty – territorial military service.

The peculiar assumption of the Concept is that TDT subunits training will be organize on three levels: county, province and country one. Basic training is to be conducted in a county. A specialized training is to be organized at training centers set up next to brigade’s HQ. And subsequently, on the highest level there are supposed to be integrated trainings organized at the military training areas. A 3-year training cycle is scheduled for TDT soldiers and subunits in weekends, 30 days per year.

TDT soldiers, except professional ones, should store their uniforms at homes and equipment and arms at a county’s police station, where a particular subunit is located or at the TDT battalion HQ barracks.

Without any doubts there are advantages of the concept as follows:

1) Increase of the number of Polish Armed Forces troops at peace time,
2) Incorporation of paramilitary organizations’ members in the process of the TDT units’ foundation,
3) Motivation elements to encourage to serve in the TDT.

Important disadvantages of the concept are as follows:

1) Decrease of the operational troops’ capabilities and capacities due to substantial requirements in terms of professional soldiers needed in newly founded TDT units,
2) Inefficient professional preparation of the soldiers appointed to TDT units’ HQs – adequate to specifics of the units’ operations,
3) Not taking into account problems connected to effectiveness of the recruitment system to possess professional and territorial soldiers to achieve in 2019 the assumed number of troops,
4) Incorrect assumption in the training model in counties due to a lack of training infrastructure - to build shooting ranges and exercise fields require not only money but also time,
5) Lack of proper infrastructure for TDT units planned to be founded in 2017-2019,
6) Too optimistic assumption concerning a possibility to achieve the planned manning level in the TDT in 2019.

6. Territorial Defense Troops as a type of the armed forces

On 1 January 2017 a change dated on 16 November 2016 to the Act on the Common Defense Duty of the Republic of Poland and other acts was implemented. It introduced the fifth type of armed forces – Territorial Defense Troops and territorial military service as a form of an active military service. The Act describes the range of duties and responsibilities of the TDT Commander and ways to appoint for territorial military service as well as basis for release from the service.

As a consequence, at the beginning of January 2017 President of the Republic of Poland assigned brigadier Wieslaw Kukula on the position of the Commander of

58 The first officers designated to the TDT were commissioned in November 2017.
59 Dz.U. 2016, position 2138.
Territorial Defense Troops. The range of his duties and responsibilities includes among others:

1) Planning, organizing and conducting of a training of subordinated military units and organizations,
2) Planning and organizing of a mobilization and operational deployment and use of the TDT,
3) Preparation of troops and equipment to combat;
4) Realization of tasks connected to a participation in natural disasters relief operations and combating their effects, protection of materials, search and rescue operations, protection of people’s health and life as well as a participation in crisis management activities,
5) Cooperation with other entities in the area of the country defense.

The TDT Commander is subordinated directly to the Minister of Defense.

In 2016 there was the TDT Command founded in Warsaw and three brigades’ HQs together with subordinated TDT battalions in provinces (voivodeships):

- Podlaskie (1. Podlaska Territorial Defense Brigade – Białystok),
- Lubelskie (2. Lubelska Territorial Defense Brigade – Lublin),

In 2017 the foundation of three brigades’ HQs started in provinces:

- Warmińsko-mazurskim (4. Warmińsko-Mazurska Territorial Defense Brigade HQ – Olsztyn),

Organization structures of a TDT brigade and battalion are similar to other military units on a tactical level. There are 4 light infantry battalions, logistics and HQ subunits in a brigade. In a TDT battalion (app. 700 – 800 soldiers) there are up to five light infantry companies and HQ elements.
According to official data published on 15 January 2018\(^6^0\) the TDT consist of almost 8,000 soldiers with app. 6,500 territorial military service ones and 1,470 professional soldiers moved from other Polish Armed Forces units. It may be concluded from the above that supplementing of the TDT units by professional soldiers (over 18% of the TDT manning level) is done at the operational troops’ expense. At the turn of the first and second quarter of the year the TDT Command intends to conduct a training for volunteers in brigades founded in warmińsko-mazurskie and mazowieckie provinces. The basic training lasts 16 days. Moreover, in 2018 it is planned to establish the TDT Training Center in Siedlce. Considering the current number of TDT soldiers it might be assumed that newly founded TDT units maintain a low manning level and taking into account the hitherto tempo to collect new candidates the declared by the Ministry of Defense number of 53,000 TDT soldiers by the end of 2019 will not be achieved.

An important for the new type of armed forces is equipment. In accordance with the Concept to establish territorial defense troops (phase I 2016-2017) units should be equipped with light, modern equipment e.g. machine guns, grenade launchers, antitank launchers and mortars. However, according to the Ministry of Defense “…it is planned to equip the TDT subunits with individual and team equipment implemented in Polish Armed Forces and following technical parameters and standards of the equipment used by other types of armed forces. Both professional and territorial soldiers will be equipped with the same types of equipment regardless of time or type of military service”\(^6^1\).

An additional difficulty, especially in case of TDT units’ training and support, is inadequate number of transportation means.

Analyzing hitherto period of the TDT operations there are conclusions as follows:

1) A contemporary subordination of TDT, other than for another types of armed forces, does not ensure the TDT Commander to realize the

\(^6^0\) http://www.mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/formowanie-brygad-ot-w-polsce-centralnej-m2018-01-15/
legal requirements to prepare the subordinated units to combat and, especially, to get them ready to conduct joint operations,

2) Previous low manning level of TDT units may result in failure to achieve combat readiness by the end of 2019,

3) Military training of perspective officers at the officers’ course for TDT is not effective enough to allow graduates to command and train in a responsible way. Differently from a full-time study a 12-month course cannot educate officers from candidates who have not previously served in military. It is to be pointed out, too, that soldiers – volunteers to territorial service – are sent to units just after only few-day basic training. Considering all that as well as training facilities’ deficit, a problem with training quality and effectiveness may appear.

4) Inefficient number of properly trained specialists to the TDT HQ, brigades and battalions’ HQs is and will be supplemented by soldiers from other types of the armed forces resulting in decrease of operational units’ capabilities and capacities,

5) A recruitment system to both professional and territorial military service is not prepared for increased manning level in the Polish Armed Forces,

6) Financial resources utilized to procure arms and equipment for founded TDT units may inhibit or stop the key modernization programs of the Polish Armed Forces.

7. Territorial defense perspectives

Territorial defense units, in accordance with the assumptions, act in areas of responsibility which duplicate areas where soldiers who create a unit live. That is why when an enemy enters the area the TDT soldiers transfer to irregular operations. Essentially they will operate in a spread out formation and their concentration will happen only to fulfill a particular task. Considering lessons learnt from such operations this method seems to be the most effective one. A necessary

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62 On 23 October 2017 President of the Republic of Poland signed a modification to the Act on the Polish Armed Forces rebuild and modernization and financing, according to which the established manning level was increased to 200 K from which 150 K for professional soldiers.

63 Irregular operations in the area taken by enemy.
condition to move seamlessly from regular operations to guerrilla type ones, to conduct irregular actions, is previous preparation.

In every sphere of life one of the key issue which influences directly a success of a planned event is to have updated and reliable information. A way to get it may differ but, without doubt, one method is so called open-source intelligence. According to some sources up to 70% of information gathered by a potential adversary comes from such the method. What does it mean and how it effects future TDT operations? The answer seems to be simple – essential. One of the key rules of action at future irregular operations is a conspiracy and it must be prepare now, at peace-time. It is difficult to achieve in the cyber era when there is a tendency to “exist” in social media and all information about prospective guerrillas in a particular area might be collected – not only about them but about their families, friends, address, work, habits, weaknesses and, often, meeting points, too. A bank of information build at peace time and based on it may be utilized by an adversary at time of a conflict.

7.1 A range of additional tasks

Discussing the TDT perspectives a review of possible tasks should be made. Analyzing contents concerning areas of responsibilities, they might be divided on military activities and crisis management ones\(^{65}\). The second area is clear and common for all such formations in other countries but the first one require a closer analyses. In the previously mentioned Act on the common defense duty where the TDT Commander’s range of duties and responsibilities is listed, in Article 11c, paragraph 2, points 4 and 6 it is specified that his tasks, among others, are to

\(^{64}\) In the past such operations were conducted by e.g. the Polish Home Army. Similar operations were observed in Afghanistan at clashes with Taliban – during days-peasants and at nights-guerrillas.
\(^{65}\) http://www.mon.gov.pl/obrona-terytorialna/o-nas/zadania-wot-n2016-12-27/ - “Among tasks for territorial defense soldiers are:

- Combat operations in cooperation with operational troops (in case of a conflict break out). A goal of these operations will be to destroy or stop a potential adversary,
- People’s protection against natural disasters’ effects, combating the effects, protection of goods, search and rescue operations or protection of human’s health and live and, participation in crisis management operations,
- Local communities’ protection against destabilization and disinformation effects,
- Cooperation with the elements of the county’s defense system especially with provinces’ governors and local authorities,
- Local communities’ protection against cyber attacks,
- Propagation of patriotic education in society.”
prepare TDT personnel and equipment to combat and cooperation with organizations and entities participating in national defense operations.

A package of possible tasks is broad and these are not only irregular operations which are attached to TDT after our territory is taken by an adversary. Regular operations should also be considered before and during a defensive operation conducted by other types of armed forces. Among them it should be examined:

1) Terrain analyses and operational preparation of assigned areas of responsibility,

2) Territorial reconnaissance and recce activities for both TDT and operational forces (both national and allied) with a special focus on:
   a) Data collection and update connected to internal threats and in a vicinity of a border that directly influence troops’ deployment in their AORs,
   b) Providing updated information about terrain and infrastructure (including a level of damages) and about an enemy’s commando threats and enemy air-born operations in time of a conflict,

3) Security / protection of the logistics system which supports operational and territorial troops at peace, crisis and war, including logistics organizations in case of occupation,

4) Participation in HNS activities for allied forces. TDT should play a special role at:
   a) Security of assigned areas or objects,
   b) Direct security and/or defense of areas/objects,
   c) Patrolling and security of assigned objects,
   d) Reconnaissance of areas or directions in vicinity of protected (secured, defended) objects, especially these in danger of enemy clandestine operations,

5) Protection of critical infrastructure and objects important for the national security,

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66 Host Nation Support – realization of tasks at peace, crisis and war by a host nation for allied forces and NATO organizations, deployed or moving via its territory.
6) Anti-diversionary operations conducted independently or as a participation in anti-diversionary defense. The TDT activities will follow the HNS ones in this area,

7) Participation in combating enemy’s air assaults, mainly during landing and land combat,

8) Security operations including:
   a) Fortification of lines and areas of responsibility,
   b) Building obstacles and making damages,
   c) Reconnaissance activities,
   d) Defense of chosen lines and objects,
   e) Monitoring of areas with less probability of an enemy offensive operations,

9) Inhibiting operations, defense of an assigned area, position or an object. The key of such an action should be endurance and flexibility matched for the enemy. Areas with forests and lakes, mountains and urban terrains would be preferred for such operations,

10) Tasks within a strategic and operational deception and camouflage.

Considering the contemporary equipment of the TDT, short training period and a need to minimize potential losses caused by the enemy, a special focus should be on tasks connected to security of objects (including logistics installations), deception / camouflage and HNS. Taking over a substantial part of the last two tasks by the TDT would significantly decrease a stress put on operational forces and connected to supplemental activities. It would result in making conditions for their deeper engagement in combat operations.

A value and importance of deception operations, camouflage and HNS are concisely presented below.

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67 Both offensive and defensive.
68 Together with units dedicated for such tasks, founded at war.
69 Taking over of the full range of the tasks is not possible because of existing structure, equipment and task organization. Such tasks must be planned on the central level within a single plan and realized separately, according to received orders.
7.2 A utilization of territorial defense troops for camouflage and deception operations

Camouflage and deception – a type of combat service to hide subunits, their formation, equipment, material storage points, fortifications, command and control posts, routes, against all types of enemy reconnaissance or, to mislead enemy in terms of own troops intentions.\(^70\)

The goals of camouflage and deception are reached by:\(^71\):

1) Concealment,
2) Deception,
3) Demonstration activities,
4) Disinformation.

The key to achieve the goal presented above is a discipline in both camouflage and deception. It relies on camouflage and deception activities conducted in a proper place and time and followed by all types of troops and forces, tactical formations, units, subunits and single soldiers. A success can be reached through a thorough planning (on an operational level) and careful implementation of the plan by troops designated for the operation.

Rich experience, including the Polish art of war, proves that well organized and implemented camouflage and deception activities ensure an ability to maintain troops' combat readiness and, indirectly, a possibility of a victory. In strategic, operational and tactical dimensions they enable to deceive an enemy in terms of a mission’s intent, troops’ activities and location and a character of important military, administration, industrial and communication objects.\(^72\)

Camouflage does not only mean a cover for a tank or other military equipment so it is less visible for an enemy reconnaissance (unfortunately for many camouflage means mainly or even only tactical / direct concealment). Camouflage is an idea to deceive an enemy in terms of troops’ location and intent. The key rule is to conceal

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\(^70\) Polish Army Doctrine, Syg. DWLąd Wew. 115/2008.
\(^71\) Słownik podstawowych terminów wojskowych (Dictionary of Basic Military Terms). MON, SG WP-Komisja Słownictwa Wojskowego, Syg. SG 815/77.
a real status and demonstrate a false one. It is an art to fake own forces and intents and, simultaneously, mislead an enemy in terms of our real actions. Camouflage and deception can be an effective tool to achieve assumed goals. It is an “elaborated game” full of decoys and assumptions. There are many examples of their implementation both in the history of the WW II\(^73\) and contemporary\(^74\). By used actions a false picture of own intentions is created to ensure an enemy that in a particular place a decisive part of own troops is assembled whereas in reality they are in other place to achieve an effect of surprise. It is worth to quote a Prussian general Helmut von Moltke thesis: “No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force”. At war an uncertainty is the only certain fact. As a result it creates perfect conditions to generate false information. Nowadays, information is perceived as a separate scope, powerful weapon and an important goal and new intelligence gathering means multiply data. Its size itself causes analytical problems especially at war. That is why a deception should use not only an enemy’s susceptibility to false information but a paralysis caused by too much data\(^75\), as well.

A clear conclusion is that bigger resources utilized for operational camouflage and deception result in multiple numbers of bogus objects, troops’ assembly areas, their maneuvers and, as a consequence, multiple false data for an enemy. Even though permanently developed intelligence collection capabilities (e.g. SAR technology\(^76\) which enable to detect Russian means of camouflage\(^77\)) – since 2006 Russia has rapidly increased deliveries of camouflage and deception equipment to troops\(^78\). Old, rubber models used in the last century could not be utilized nowadays.

\(^75\) Ibidem.
\(^76\)Synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) is a form of radar that is used to create two- or three-dimensional images of objects, such as landscapes of the Earth and other planets with a teledetection techniques. SAR uses the motion of the radar antenna over a target region to provide finer spatial resolution than conventional beam-scanning radars. SAR is typically mounted on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or spacecraft.
\(^77\) Wykrywanie rosyjskich nadmuchiwanych „wabików” (pułapek) za pomocą SAR (Detection of Russian inflatable decoys (traps) with SAR), http://syntheticapertureradar.com/detecting-russian-inflatable-decoys-with-sar/.
\(^78\) „The owner of Rusbalt Company which manufacture pneumatic models for military announced that in a few last years her business rapidly developed although she didn’t want to share details with the journalist. Orders from military only last year were supposed to “rocket”. Her deeds from rubber and textile are to deceive NATO in terms of Russian armed forces intents and capabilities. The Rusbalt Company manufactures, among other,
But industry stays agile in this area. Contemporary models are equipped with heaters and covered with special foil that reflects radio waves what cause that such “objects” are visible in infrared spectrum and by radars of an adversary.

Poland, similarly to other European countries as well as the U.S. and China, is equipped with models. In accordance with the internet sources, in our country the Lubawa S.A. company specializes in a production of such equipment.

Considering all that, including intensive Russian preparations to deception operations, it seems reasonable to put more focus on such activities in Poland, too. Building capabilities in terms of survival and force protection through a utilization of the newest, effective camouflage means, deception and disinformation, results in:

- Minimal losses caused by an enemy,
- Maximal potential maintained by own troops.

It seems effective to use territorial defense troops in this exact range. It is just a matter of correct equipment and preparation. Planning, balanced deployment of the TDT units in the country, knowledge of terrain, command and control structures and communication means already at peace cause that camouflage and disinformation aspects may be included in a training process. It would be a combat support element and a part of cooperation with operational troops as a part of the reinforced survival and force protection system. It would match the range of duties and responsibilities of this type of armed forces prescribed by the law.

**7.3 A use of territorial defense for HNS tasks**

The change in a geopolitical reality of Poland led to implementation of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), announced on 3 June 2014 by the U.S. President Barrack Obama while he visited our country. The ERI declared objectives are:

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1) Increased number of trainings and military exercises and rotational presence of U.S. troops in Europe, especially in the NATO Eastern flank countries,

2) Establishment in NATO member countries, in Central and Eastern Europe, subunits which consist of the U.S. planners. Their goal is to increase the possibility and range of common exercises and rotations,

3) Increase of the U.S. Armed Forces capabilities for reaction in Europe through e.g.: prepositioning of military equipment and materials as well as infrastructure improvements,

4) Increase of the U.S. Navy participation in NATO naval forces through permanent deployment of a fleet at both Black and Baltic seas,

5) Establishment of capabilities to cooperate with countries assumed as close friends, like: Georgia, Ukraine and Moldavia.

One of the effects of the initiative and its successor – European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and decisions taken at the NATO summit in Warsaw (Enhanced Forward Presence) is a new dimension of the HNS issue. It is the result of the fact that the U.S. and other allied countries troops’ presence in last few years has became de facto persistent.

A necessity to maintain a capability to conduct HNS obligations is a consequence of the contents of Article 3 of the NATO treaty which explicitly impose on member countries an obligation to maintain and develop individual capabilities to thwart a military attack. For Poland, due to its geographical location, organizational, material and territorial capabilities and capacities, one of the key elements which decide about maintaining the above mentioned capability is effective and efficient reception and support of the allied enhancement forces. Every NATO member country has a duty to properly plan, organize and improve the support system through implementation of appropriate legal regulations, establishment of organizations to fulfill HNS tasks either in time of peace or crisis or at war.

80 Dz.U. 2000, No 87, position 970.
Moreover, it is to be pointed out that as a part of a collective responsibility NATO and allied countries’ leaders are obliged to support activities conducted by NATO either as a sending country or a receiving one.

The catalogue of tasks fulfilled within HNS is broad. Basically, from the NATO Commander or other NATO country perspective, it would be hard to find a country’s functional area which might be excluded from it. However, it should be stressed that a support dedicated to the allied enhancement forces under HNS will be a supplement to capabilities and capacities of a country that sends its forces to Poland. The range of activities (support) is specified by agreements signed within NATO or bilateral or multilateral contracts between “a host nation” and NATO as an organization (NATO Commanders) and a country or countries which send troops.

Functions and obligations as well as tasks in an HNS planning and organizing processes derive from doctrinal documents, which specify groups of tasks as follows\(^{81}\):

- Main,
- Specific:
  - Sending country obligations;
  - Receiving country obligations;
  - Realized by NATO commanders.

More detailed scope of tasks within HNS, according to the area criteria, may include:

1) Preventive and security activities,
2) Access to areas and objects for allied enhancement forces deployment,
3) Access to utilities and materials,
4) Medical support,
5) Access to services, fire brigade support, lodging, sanitary and communication services,

6) Realization of particular transportation functions, including an access to the transportation network detached to receive personnel and materials of a sending country, support in movement planning and organizing.

7) Press, legal and other support.

The scope of HNS includes subsystems, like: defense command and control, military and non-military, which are the elements of the Republic of Poland defense system. Tasks are realized on three functional levels: political-military, strategic-operational and tactical.

On the first level the authorized national organizations participate, within their competencies, in building of alliance trust instruments, legal fundaments to fulfill received alliance obligations and lead the implementation of the tasks. It is expressed by a participation in preparation, staffing and signing of multilateral and bilateral general agreements.

On the next level an important role is played by elements of the military subsystem. The Minister of Defense Representative for HNS acts as a coordinator of the whole spectrum of activities. The key tasks on this level are: planning of necessary activities to ensure fulfillment of host nation obligations, maintaining data about HNS capabilities and capacities to support sending countries and NATO commanders deployed to Poland, preparation and implementation of necessary international agreements and preparation of analysis, assessments and suggestions concerning HNS organization and operation in Poland.

The lowest functional level includes Polish Armed Forces military units assigned to implement host nation tasks, territorial military organizations, public administration and other non-military elements of the defense system. The key tasks on the tactical level are as follows: maintaining data bases about available resources, participation in detailed planning to support operations (exercises) and practical support of the allied forces. Public administration institutions realize HNS tasks included in operational plans, respectively: governmental administration and provinces (voivodeships) and which derive from signed agreements.

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82 A Chief of J4 of the General Staff is assigned as the MOD Representative.
From the national defense system elements’ standpoint the key role is played by the Strategy and Defense Planning Department, General Staff Logistics Directorate J4 and the Inspectorate of Armed Forces Support.

Main tasks of the Inspectorate of Armed Forces Support, in this area, are as follows: practical support of allied troops taking part in exercises conducted in Poland and its calculation, participation in both national and allied staff trainings (HNS issues), allied troops transit support via Polish territory and realization of sending country tasks.

Presented above general idea of the HNS scope, keeping in mind TDT characteristics, like: advantage of terrain knowledge – connected to a living place of soldiers, preparation and maintaining on a proper level of readiness the defense infrastructure in the area of responsibility, updated information about the status of transportation infrastructure, cooperation with non-military defense system and knowledge about local industry allow to point potential tasks for this type of the armed forces.

Operational and supporting tasks may be implemented in the scope of HNS.

Operational ones are as follows:

1) Protection of assigned areas and objects,
2) Direct security and/or defense of areas/objects,
3) Patrolling and security of assigned objects’ zones,
4) Reconnaissance of areas or directions in vicinity of protected (secured, defended) objects, especially under diversion threat,
5) Support of allied enhancement forces’ movement.

On the other hand supporting tasks might be:

1) Liaison with territorial military administration, governmental and local administration, concerning HNS activities,
2) Support in contacts with local industries which might supply goods and services to the allied enhancement troops.
It is to be outlined that TDT capabilities to realize HNS tasks would be a part of contemporary planning, organizational and implementation solutions. To build such competencies would involve all levels of the TDT chain of command. Having in mind hitherto experience which derives from practical support of exercises and movement of allied troops for last few years, it would be very important to cooperate with territorial supply system and territorial military administrative system. Territorial defense units should conduct tasks connected to allied enhancement troops’ security and protection and it such a way operational forces’ capabilities would not be decreased when in combat.

Potential positive decision to create particular capabilities of the territorial defense troops to execute host-nation support missions implies a need to initiate actions to include TDT in the existing HNS system.

Firstly, there is a necessity to review contemporary national capabilities, including armed forces' capabilities in this area, which would include analysis of existing legal regulations, duties and responsibilities of organizations which participate in the system, their structures and lessons learnt from the implementation of EDI, ERI and eFP (Enhanced Forward Presence) initiatives. Next, based on conclusions and recommendations from this analysis, a concept of changes and improvements should be elaborated to include the TDT in the process. An acceptance of the suggested solutions would allow to elaborate documents (orders) to implement approved decisions. Subsequently, it would be necessary to make periodical analysis of the HNS system, executed in new conditions, and make potential corrections.

A good opportunity to initiate actions in this area is announced by the Ministry of Defense change of the Polish Armed Forces command and control system as a recommendation of the Strategic Defense Review that was completed last year.

Conclusions

Experiences from both the history of wars and other countries defense systems’ functioning together with an analysis of the geostrategic situation of Poland, political situation - including alliances, should be a foundation of our national defense
model. From the above presented factors we only cannot influence history and our geographical location. The rest depends either directly or indirectly on us because as a nation we create reality by, for example, effective internal and international politics, shaping our defense system.

It cannot be denied that the cooperation of territorial defense troops and operational ones significantly increases our country military defense subsystem’s capabilities and capacities. The essential military force designated to both offense and defense operations are operational troops and their number, efficiency and capabilities influence in a measurable way a conduct and potential success of future operations. Territorial defense units, adequately prepared from the organizational standpoint, properly trained and equipped, are a very important support for operational troops. To increase capabilities and capacities of our troops it is recommended to found in every type of armed forces subunits designated to execute operational camouflage and deception as well as HNS tasks – within a personnel limit of the TDT.

However, the TDT cannot be founded by decreasing potential of other armed forces. It is absolutely necessary to reestablish the operational forces’ manning level by redirecting the professional soldier from the territorial defense units – with required skills and qualifications. Possessed before 2015 capabilities of territorial defense battalions should be developed as well as a training process should be reactivated – similarly like it was organize at the DRAGON-15 military exercise.

Utilizing experiences from the period of the TDT foundation it is a need to assess the contemporarily existing concept of their creation. To elaborate rational solutions a war gaming should firstly be organized with different courses of actions (CoA) for the use of TDT. In the first CoA the TDT would act as an independent armed force and in the second one as an integral part of other armed forces. Moreover, duties and responsibilities of the TDT should not be limited to the same ones of the Civil Defense or to crisis management activities. A simultaneous development with other types of armed forces and joint operations to achieve a common goal is a guarantee of the future success.
An achievement of the common objective – an enemy defeat and defense of the Republic of Poland integrity – requires a joint, coordinated action and consolidation of resources in particular time and place and, in the same time, execution of tasks within the same plan. To ensure a successful realization and supervision of it, it is essential to follow the gold rule of single command. Organizations of all armed forces, including Territorial Defense Troops, should be subordinated to one commander, who is responsible for command, control, planning, organization and execution of trainings of all units and organizations at peace, crisis and war. At war, the TDT acting in an operations zone need to be subordinated to a commander who is responsible for the operation.

The TDT’s capabilities to support operations conducted by operational forces and participate in them should be developed as well as execution of HNS tasks, camouflage and deception activities and protection of critical infrastructure and other, presented in this report.
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WARSZAWA

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